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CONFLICT OF LAWS: FIFTH CIRCUIT DECISION GIVES
SUPREME COURT OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE FURTHER
DEFINITION TO THE SCOPE OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE
COURTS HAvE traditionally resorted to a body of choice of law rules
and ancillary principles for solution of conflict of laws problems'
without formally considering the legitimate interests of the forum
state. However, the only limitation on a court's choice of its own
state's law is the general principle of comity2 with the further
restraint of the United States Constitution.3 In reviewing the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v.
Clay,4 the United States Supreme Court will have an opportunity
to give further definition to the extent to which the due process
clause precludes a state from giving extraterritorial effect to its own
legislation concerning contractual obligations.
The plaintiff, an Illinois resident, had obtained a personal
property floater insurance policy in that state before moving to and
becoming a resident of Florida. The policy contained a clause,
valid under the laws of Illinois, requiring that suit be brought
within one year after discovery of loss.5 A Florida statute purported
I See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). Such traditional rules have
been the subject of increasing criticism. See generally, Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL
BAsEs OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in
New Yorh, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1, 39.
2 Comity has been defined as neither a matter of absolute obligation nor of mere
courtesy but a recognition which one state or nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 163-64 (1895).
1 Of principal concern here are the full faith and credit clause and the due process
clause. Also operative in the area of conflict of laws are the privileges and im-
munities clause and the equal protection clause. See generally, Currie, The Constitu-
tion and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26
U. Cm. L. REv. 9 (1958). The Constitution grants Congress the power of imple-
menting the effect of those clauses in the area of conflict of laws. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Conum'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502
(1939). However, with slight exception, Congress has failed to exercise that power
and the Supreme Court continues in the task of giving case by case definition to their
effect on conflict of law. COOK, op. cit. supra note 1, ch. IV.
319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
5 The suit clause provided: "No suit, action or proceeding for the recovery of any
claim under this Policy shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless the
same be commenced within twelve (12) months next after discovery by the Assured
of the occurrence which gives rise to the claim. Provided, however, that if by the
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to invalidate all such suit clauses.0 After becoming a resident of
Florida the insured sustained a loss of property located in that
state, but failed to bring suit until fifteen months after discovery of
the loss. The Court of Appeals held that the due process clause is
violated by application of the Florida statute.7 Certiorari has been
granted.8
The United States Supreme Court has held in workmen's
compensation decisions that prima facie every state is constitution-
ally entitled to enforce its own statutes,9 in its own courts, and that
regardless of the place of the employment contract, 10 residence of
the parties to that contract," and, under certain circumstances,
even the place of injury,12 if the forum has a legitimate interest in
applying its own state's policy the application of a local statute will
be sustained. Economic and physical protection of employees in-
laws of the state within which this Policy is issued such limitation is invalid, then
any such claims shall be void unless such action, suit or proceeding be commenced
within the shortest limit of time permitted by the laws of such state to be fixed
herein." Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 215 n.8 (1960).
6 FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1961). Relevant portions are: "All provisions and stipulations
contained in any contract whatever... fixing the period of time in which suit may
be instituted... at a period of time less than that provided by the statute of limitations
of this state, are hereby declared ... to be illegal and void. No court in this state
shall give effect to any provision or stipulation of the character mentioned in this
section." FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (3) (1961) provides a five-year limitation for actions on
written contracts not under seal.
7Upon certiorari after an earlier identical holding by the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court abstained from the constitutional question and remanded for
certification to the Florida Supreme Court. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207
(1960). The Florida court found that state's "contact with the subject contract and
parties" sufficient for the statute to be applicable. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133
So. 2d 735, 738 (Fla. 1961). Although the Court of Appeals, in its latest decision,
recognized the binding effect of a state's choice of law on the federal courts, applica-
tion of the Florida statute was held again to be precluded by the due process
clause. The significant contacts test, apparently used by the Court of Appeals and
the Florida Supreme Court to determine the constitutional question, generally has
been used as a choice of law rule rather than in determining the constitutionality of
that choice. As a choice of law rule it has been stated: "The validity of a contract
is determined by the local law of the state with which the contract has its most
significant relationship...." RSTATMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 332 (a)
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960). The contacts test differs from the traditional rules men-
tioned supra note 1, but is superficially similar to the governmental-interest analysis
characteristically used by the Supreme Court in conflict of laws questions with a
constitutional basis. See Currie, supra note 1, at 39. The leading case in the use of
governmental-interest analysis is Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532 (1935).Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1935).
10 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
:1 Ibid.
12 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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jured within the state'3 and of those injured elsewhere who have
returned and may burden that state's welfare system 14 are typical
legitimate interests which justified application of the forum's statute.
Although these decisions turn primarily on the full faith and credit
clause, they illustrate the governmental-interest analysis character-
istically used by the Court in determining the constitutionality of
a court's choice of its own state's law.15
Three cases, turning primarily on the due process clause, appear
to be most pertinent to Sun Insurance. In.Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 6
a policy had been obtained by a Mexican citizen from a Mexican
insurance company to insure a tugboat, only while in Mexican
waters. An assignee of that policy, a Mexican resident technically
domiciled in Texas, sought to recover from two New York insurance
companies, reinsurers of the Mexican company. The Court held
that application by the Texas courts of a Texas suit clause statute
had deprived defendant of property without due process of law.
In Hartford Acc. Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co.,'1 de-
fendant had insured the plaintiff, a Mississippi corporation with its
principal place of business in Tennessee, against defalcations by its
employees. The policy contained a clause, valid under the laws
of Tennessee, requiring that all claims of loss be made within
fifteen months after expiration of the policy. Plaintiff corporation
subsequently moved its office to Mississippi where, more than fifteen
months after expiration of the policy, it brought suit to recover
losses resulting from defalcations by its treasurer there. Application
of a Mississippi statute invalidating the claim limitation clause
was held to be unconstitutional'18
13 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
:"Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
2rSee generally, Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv.
581 (1953); Currie, supra note 3, at 9-14. The Brief for the Appellant (defendant) in
the Court of Appeals proceeded generally on the basis of governmental-interest
analysis.
10281 U.S. 397 (1930).
'- 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
'8 Similar cases denying the validity of applying the law of the forum are: when a
life insurance policy had been obtained by a New York resident in that state, and
in which the insured had died before his beneficiary wife moved to and brought
suit in Georgia, John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); and
when an insurance policy had been obtained in Tennessee by a resident of that
state who later moved to Texas, obtained a conversion policy in exchange for the
original, and subsequently brought suit there, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266
U.S. 389 (1924). Dunken involved a Texas statute imposing 12% interest and
reasonable attorney's fees for failure to pay claims within thirty days of demand.
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However, in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.,19 ap-
plication of a statute of the forum state was upheld. Defendant had
issued a liability insurance policy to a Massachusetts manufacturer
of home permanents. A clause in that policy prohibited direct
actions against the insurer until after final determination of the
obligation of the insured. A Louisiana statute, permitting direct
action before final determination of obligation, had been applied
in an action by plaintiff to recover for personal injury resulting
from use of the product. After distinguishing Dick and Delta &
Pine20 Mr. Justice Black wrote for the Court: Some contracts made
locally, affecting nothing but local affairs may well justify a
denial to other states of power to alter those contracts. But, as
this case illustrates, a vast part of the business affairs of this nation
does not present such simple local situations.21 Louisiana had mani-
fested its natural interest in the injured by providing remedies for
recovery of damages and had a similar interest in policies of in-
surance which are designed to assure ultimate payment of such
damages. Because of these legitimate interests, the due process
clause had not been violated; and for similar reasons, the full faith
and credit clause did not compel Louisiana to subordinate its statute
to the contract rules of Massachusetts. 22
Although both Dick and Delta & Pine were relied on by the
Court of Appeals as controlling in the instant case, each can be
factually distinguished. Dick only denies a forum's choice of its
Although apparently on point with Sun Insurance, Dunken may be of limited vitality
in that the decision did not consider the interest of Texas in the litigation. There
is no reference to the case in the Brief for the Appellant. See also New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914), which held that the state in which a contract
was made could not apply its own law when neither party was a resident of that
state either at time of contracting or of suit.
' 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
20As to Dick, Mr. Justice Black said, "the subject matter of the contract related
in no manner to anything that had been done or was to be done in Texas .... But
this Court carefully pointed out that its decision might have been different had
activities relating to the contract taken place in Texas upon which the state could
properly lay hold as a basis for regulation," and as to Delta & Pine he said,
"Mississippi activities in connection with the policy were found to be so 'slight'
and so 'casual' that Mississippi could not apply its own law.... Again, however, the
Court carefully noted that there might be future cases in which the terms of out-of-
state contracts would be so repugnant to the vital interests of the forum state as to
justify nonenforcement." 348 U.S. at 71.21 Id.
22Id. at 72-73. Claims under other clauses of the Constitution were summarily
dismissed: the direct action statute was valid under the equal protection clause be-
cause it had no discriminatory effect, and under the contract clause because the
statute had become effective before the contract was made. Id. at 70.
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own law when that state's only interest is the technical domicile of
the plaintiff; and Delta & Pine dealt not with a clause requiring suit
within one year after knowledge of the loss, but with a clause
requiring notice of claim within fifteen months after expiration
of the policy.23 Furthermore, Mr. Justice Black has suggested that
the result might have been otherwise if Delta & Pine had been de-
cided in more recent years.2 4  Although these cases define the scope
of the due process clause with regard to their particular facts, it is
inherent in the concept of that clause that its scope be determined
by a "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion." 25  In
Watson the state's interest brought the application of its direct
action statute within the scope of due process. Whether Florida's
interest, under the facts of Sun Insurance, is of the same nature is
the question before the Court.
Prior decisions indicate no standard used by the Court in de-
termining the constitutionality of the extraterritorial application of
legislation such as Florida's suit clause statute. However, an
analogy can be found in cases involving retroactive legislation.2 6 In
both situations a state's legislative policy operates to enlarge pre-
23 The claim clause protects the insurer from stale claims without shortening the
insured's action time. The suit clause protects the insurer from stale claims but
also shortens the insured's action time in a manner declared inoperative by the laws
of a majority of the states. See, CARNAHAN, CONFLICr OF LAWS AND Lin' INSURANCE
CONTRACTS § 26 (h) n.83 (1958).
2 "I, myself, have grave doubts that the Delta & Pine Land Co. case would be
treated the same way today on its facts." Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S.
207, 220 (1960). It may be significant that both Dick and Delta & Pine were decided
before Alaska Packers, the leading case in governmental-interest analysis. Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
21 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
20 Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28
U. Cmi. L. REv. 258, 290-94 (1961); Currie, supra note 1, at 50-52. Retroactive legisla-
tion and extraterritorial legislation are distinguishable in that the retrospective effect
of the former eventually expires while the effect of the latter will exist as long as the
legislation itself exists. However, a countervailing distinction can be made. Sub-
jection of a contract to otherwise constitutional legislation having extraterritorial
effect might reasonably have been within the expectation of the parties; whereas,
retrospective legislation must come as a surprise.
It has been suggested that in conflict of laws situations such as Sun Insurance the
constitutionality of the extraterritorial legislation might sometimes turn on whether,
at time of enactment, that legislation had been declared retroactive. Ibid. Such a
declaration of retroactivity would be an indication of the exigency of the state's
policy, particularly if the legislation had been recently enacted. However, the
Florida suit clause invalidation statute was enacted in 1913. Although that legislation
was, in fact, not declared retroactive, its most significant aspect would seem to be
that it purported to declare void all suit clauses in "any contract whatever" and
commanded that no court in that state give effect to any such clause. FLA. STAT.
§ 95.03 (1961).
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existing rights or obligations. Yet, not all retroactive legislation
violates due process, the test essentially being one of reasonableness
in light of all the circumstances. 27 It also has been suggested that,
in conjunction with the reasonableness test, the Court considers
whether a party has changed his position in reliance on the existing
law28 and whether the retrospective aspect of the legislation gives
effect to the reasonable expectation of the parties. 20
Fundamental to any consideration of Sun Insurance is an under-
standing of Florida's interest in it. The elements of that interest
might be characterized as (1) the interest of a state in the economic
welfare of its citizens,30 (2) its interest in all personal property lo-
cated within its borders,3 1 and (3) its interest in the regulation of
insurance within the state.32
There is little doubt that Florida could have asserted its interest
if the contract had been entered into in that state 3 or that it could
have been asserted if Clay had been a Florida citizen at the time
of obtaining the insurance in Illinois.34  Because Clay was, instead,
a citizen of Illinois at the time of contracting, the insurer seeks to
stand on a clause which is inoperative under the laws of Florida.
The criteria used by the Court in retroactive legislation cases would
seem to be peculiarly applicable since Florida's interest arose only
after the contract had been made, when Clay became a citizen of
that state.
27 See, e.g., Home Bldg. 8: Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), in which
Chief Justice Hughes said: "Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only the
concerns of individuals or of classes were involved, and that those of the State itself
were touched only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental interests
of the State are directly affected; and that the question is no longer merely that of
one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to
safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all depends." Id. at 442.
2s Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legisla-
tion, 73 HARV. L. Rxv. 692, 696 (1960).
29 Ibid.
3 Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). Referring to the
Florida statute in Sun Insurance, Mr. Justice Black has said "[It is] in line with the
'protective safeguards, that States have felt it necessary to create so as to preserve a
fair opportunity for people who have bought and paid for insurance to go to court
and collect it." Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 215 (1960).
31For example, the state has exclusive power of taxation of all tangible personal
property located within its borders. Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904). The
presence or absence of the personal property within the state of the forum might be
determinative under some circumstances. See examples, infra note 41.
3 2 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943); Pink v. A.A.A. Highway
Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941).
23 See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
3' See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914).
[Vol. 1964: 369
CONFLICT OF LAWS
In Watson a similar extraterritorial application of a statute was
held to be constitutional. Arguably, application of the direct action
statute in that case had been within the reasonable expectations of
the parties. The same might be said of Sun Insurance. The policy
purported to insure against "all-risks," "World-Wide," for a term of
three years3 No less than thirty-one states and the District of
Columbia had suit clause invalidation statutes, 6 and the Florida
statute purported to declare void all such clauses "in any contract
whatever." 37 Furthermore, it might be argued that, after moving
to Florida, the insured reasonably relied on the Florida law as
invalidating the suit clause in his policy.
Ultimately, however, this case would seem to turn on the more
general criteria of reasonableness, i.e., the reasonableness of allowing
Florida to assert its interest. Although the Court has not used the
term in its conflict of laws decisions, the standard of reasonableness
would seem to be implicit in the governmental-interest analysis it
characteristically employs. The reasonableness, and thus the con-
stitutionality, of the application of the Florida statute in this case
should be determined, in effect, by considering the strength of the
state's interest in the light of any unfairness created by the statute's
extraterritorial operation.38
The mere statement of the test points up the possible complexity
of considerations which might be made. Yet, in the instant case
that complexity must result in great part from the increasing
mobility of the nation's population.39 And that mobility of popula-
' Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 208 (1960).
d3 CARNAIAN, op. cit. supra note 23.
37 FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1957).
311 A consideration of the unfairness to the defendant, as well as of the strength of
the state's interest to be served, would seem essential to the determination of any
due process issue. However, due process determinations would not call for any
consideration of the interest of states other than of the forum, e.g., Illinois in the
instant case, since such interests do not fall within the protection of the due process
clause. See also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547
(1935), as to consideration of the interests of other states in regard to the full faith
and credit clause.
"This change in our national character has presumably resulted in a maturing
in other areas of the law. For obtaining jurisdiction without actual personal service
of process, due process requires only that a foreign corporation have "certain minimum
contacts with it [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957). The workmen's compensation cases illustrate a similar attitude
toward that mobility in an area of conflict of laws which, although most accurately
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tion would seem to strengthen the interest of Florida and of any
other state under similar circumstances, i.e., an interest in preserving
adequate and uniform legal remedies for all of its citizens holding
insurance policies on personal property owned by them in that state.
Reasonable men, of course, can and do disagree as to the consti-
tutionality of application of Florida's statute in the instant case.40
Seemingly, however, Florida's interest should be sufficient. The
state's traditional concern with matters of insurance, personal prop-
erty and legal remedies are interrelated. In an age when the
migration of potential litigants is commonplace, the state's policy
of providing fair and uniform contract remedies should not be
thwarted because of the place of contract or residence of the parties
at the time of contract. In other cases, circumstances may demand
the denial of the forum's freedom of choice of laws.41 But such
facts must stand on their own, without arbitrary reliance on place
of contract or residence of the parties. In Sun Insurance those facts
do not exist.
characterized as statutory, may be said to contain elements of both tort and contract
law.
. When Sun Insurance was first before the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, for the majority, termed the constitutional question a serious one. 363 U.S.
at 209. Mr. Justice Black, who thought the "answer to the constitutional question
is... clear," would have held the statute valid as applied. Id. at 214. The Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in his dissent from the majority's abstention.
,"For example, if in Sun Insurance, Clay had lost property at a home retained
by him in Illinois, even though he had moved to and become a citizen of Florida,
or if the Florida statute had imposed double liability on insurance companies for
failure to promptly pay valid claims, a different result might be called for.
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